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Press-Court Relations: Can They Be
Improved?
By THE HONORABLE ALFRED T. GOODWIN*
The relationship between the press and the judiciary in this coun-
try is sometimes strained and often misunderstood. Yet, like a shotgun
wedding, the connection is there. And it is a necessary one.
Consistently in American history the courts have acted to protect
freedom of the press. Just as consistently, the press, as critic and con-
science, has prompted responsible use of judicial power. Too often re-
cently both jurists and journalists have forgotten this essential,
symbiotic truth. -
From the beginning of our national experience, protection of the
media has been an essential task of the courts. The colonists who left
Europe to escape royal and religious oppression encountered in the
New World executive and legislative tyrannies that nearly equalled
those they had left behind. Before 1776 royal governors and colonial
legislatures regularly compelled the arrest and summary convictions of
offensive writers and publishers.' The courts, which were subordinate
to the executive and the legislature in the colonial balance of political
power, rarely intervened. Still, what little freedom of expression that
existed before the revolution, and it was precious little, was recognized
in the common law courts.
John Peter Zenger became a household name-in journalistic
households-during the early eighteenth century. His case, possibly
the first in America vindicating press rights, resulted in a jury exonerat-
ing a publisher who had offended the royal governor.2 Another half
* Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
article excerpts remarks made by Judge Goodwin at the Associated Press Managing Editors
Convention, Tulsa, Oklahoma, October 17, 1979. Prior to law school, Judge Goodwin was a
news reporter for the Eugene Oregon Register-Guard. As a judge he has chaired the ABA
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press.
The author acknowledges the substantial editorial and documentary assistance of Mr.
Rick T. Haselton, member of the Oregon Bar and formerly the author's law clerk.
1. See L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPRESSION (1960).
2. In the early 1730's, Zenger began publication of the New York Weekl, in opposition
to the New York Gazette controlled by the governor. At his trial for seditious libel in 1735,
Zenger's lawyers James Alexander and William Smith were debarred when they challenged
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
century would pass before the First Amendment was even a working
draft in James Madison's saddle bag. But the Zenger case set a prece-
dent of immeasurable influence. It encouraged other aspiring political
publicists like Benjamin Franklin and Andrew Hamilton to assert press
rights.
In modem America, the history of the struggle for press freedom
has been a story of reaction to executive or legislative attempts at op-
pression. The press has prevailed largely because of its success in the
courts of law-and at the bar of public opinion where it tends to have
the last word.
Perhaps because the press has historically come to trust the courts
as, in Alexander Bickers phrase, "the least dangerous branch,"' 3 edito-
rial reaction to some recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court has reflected a sense of outrage and betrayal. Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale,4 Herbert v. Lando,5 and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,6 have
all gone "against" the press. Contrary to some journalistic commen-
tary, however, these decisions do not herald the advent of the totalitar-
ian night. A careful reading of the Court's holdings demonstrates that,
all too frequently, they have been misunderstood by the media and
misapplied by the lower courts.
In Gannett, decided last term, the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment's public trial guarantee, at least as applied to pretrial
hearings, may be raised only by the accused and not by the public. The
Court concluded that nothing in the Sixth Amendment barred exclu-
sion of the public-and the press-from those proceedings.7
Editorial response to this decision was immediate, outraged, and
the right of the governor's appointed justice. Andrew Hamilton assumed the defense, and,
in spite of the chief justice's admonition that the question of falsehood was one of law to be
decided by the court, he convinced the jury that it was for them to determine the truthfulness
or falsity of the publication. The jury found Zenger not guilty. See J. ZENGER, A BRIEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW-
YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL, reprinted in L. RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER 173-247
(1904). Other reprints and materials may be found in V. BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER
ZENGER (1957); L. RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER (1904).
3. Bickel, of course, borrowed this expression from Hamilton's Federalist No. 78,
which discussed the role of judges as guardians of the Constitution. See A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH at ix (1962).
4. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
5. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
6. 436 U.S. 547, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978).
7. 99 S. Ct. at 2908-12. It is ironic that the Gannett holding was, in large part, pre-
mised on the Court's decision in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), a
decision widely regarded as a victory for the press. In Nebraska Press the Court invalidated
a pretrial "gag order," noting that a number of less restrictive means of mitigating prejudice
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perhaps instinctive: Slamming the Courtroom Doors,8 Private Justice,
Public Injustice,9 A Disastrous Assault.10 The chairman of the Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers Association charged that the Court was "de-
termined to unmake the Constitution."'I
Judicial reaction to Gannett has been similarly injudicious. A
number of judges have misread the opinion-indeed, one is tempted to
believe that some judges around the country have been reading the edi-
torials about Gannett instead of the opinion itself.'2 By February 1980
ninety-three judicial proceedings, including twenty-three trials, had
been closed in Gannett's wake.1
3
If journalists and judges had read the Gannett opinions more
closely, most of the headlines and closures and much of the resultant
misunderstanding between press and bench could have been avoided.
Although there is some confusion over Gannett's implications--even
the Justices seem to disagree on its meaning-some things are clear.
First, Gannett does not require court closures; rather, it permits them.
Trial judges are free to deny closure motions, and many are doing so.
Second, the Gannett majority expressly reserved (or avoided) the ques-
.tion of whether the public or the press enjoys a First Amendment right
of access to judicial proceedings.' 4 Justice Powell's concurrence recog-
nized such a right.' 5 Finally, as Chief Justice Burger's concurrence em-
phasized, Gannett involved pretrial hearings, not a trial. 16  This
from publicity were available. Among these alternatives was the closure of pretrial proceed-
ings. 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
In some ways, then, Nebraska Press was a pyrrhic victory. As Alexander Bickel com-
mented in describing the effect of another press "victory," the Pentagon Papers decision,
"[t]hose freedoms which are neither challenged nor defined are most secure." A. BicKEL,
THE MoRALITY OF CONSENT 60 (1975). See Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Ex-
pansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 476 (1977).
8. TIME, July 16, 1979, at 66.
9. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1979, § A at 16, col 1.
10. L.A. Times, July 4, 1979, § II at 7, col. 1.
11. Media Opposes Secrecy, The News Media & The Law, Aug./Sept. 1979, at 4.
12. Chief Justice Burger made a similar observation in an August 1979 interview with
the Gannett News Service. Justices Speak Out on Press, The News Media & The Law,
Nov./Dec. 1979, at 5.
13. Appellate courts have subsequently reversed 12 of these closures. Eighty-three
other closure motions have been denied by trial judges or withdrawn by the moving party.
Court Watch Summary, Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, Feb. 15, 1980.
14. This reservation of the First Amendment question is somewhat surprising since Jus-
tice Stewart, author of Gannet's lead opinion, has been a leading advocate of a special
constitutional status for the institutional press. See Stewart, "Or ofthe Press," 26 HAsTINGS
L. J. 631 (1975).
15. 99 S. Ct. at 2913-17.
16. 99 S. Ct. at 2913-14.
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distinction may be decisive in Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia,7
an appeal of a trial closure that the Supreme Court has agreed to re-
view.
Besides the qualified nature of Gannett's holding, there are several
factors which further limit the sweep of that decision. Most signifi-
cantly, many state constitutions and statutes require that judicial pro-
ceedings be open to the public. The constitution of Oregon, my home
state, declares, for example, that "[n]o court shall be secret, but justice
shall be administered, openly and without purchase .. ."I Recently
the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted that state's constitution
as barring trial closures. 19 The supreme courts of Arkansas and Minne-
sota have reached similar results, based on "open court" statutes.20
The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Fair Trial
and Free Press present another potential limitation on Gannett. Those
standards call for open judicial proceedings unless the premature re-
lease of courtroom information would present a clear and present dan-
ger to the fairness of a trial.21 Although the Supreme Court has not
17. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, appeal dismissed, Va. Supreme Ct., July 9,
1979, appealfiled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1979) (No. 79-243). hearing granted, 100
S. Ct. 204 (1979), argued, 48 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1980) (No. 79-243). Professor
Laurence Tribe, counsel for Richmond Newspapers, emphasized this distinction in his oral
argument before the court. Id.
18. OR. CONsT. art. I, § 10. Recently a Portland newspaper relied on this provision in
challenging the closure of a juvenile proceeding. Juvenile Case Privacy in Hgh Court, Port-
land Oregonian, Mar. 22, 1980, § A, at 10.
19. Keene Publ. Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, - N.H. -, 406 A.2d 137
(1979).
20. State v. Coston, No. 78-34 (Ark. Sup. Ct. November 13, 1979); State v. Coifman,
No. 72573 (Minn. Sup. Ct. October 10, 1979).
21. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1978). Standard 8-3.2., Pretrialproceedings: exclusion ofpub-
lic andsealing of records, reads as follows: "Except as provided below, pretrial proceedings
and their record shall be open to the public, including representatives of the news media. If
at the pretrial proceeding testimony or evidence is adduced that is likely to threaten the
fairness of a trial, the presiding officer shall advise those present of the danger and shall seek
the voluntary cooperation of the news media in delaying dissemination of potentially preju-
dicial information by means of public communication until the impaneling of the jury or
until an earlier time consistent with the fair administration of justice. The presiding officer
may close a preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or any other pretrial proceeding, including a
motion to suppress, and may seal the record only if. (i) the dissemination of information
from the pretrial proceeding and its record would create a clear and present danger to the
fairness of the trial, and (ii) the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot
be avoided by any reasonable alternative means. •
The defendant may move that all or part of the proceeding be closed to the public
(including representatives of the news media), or, with the consent of the defendant, the
presiding officer may take such action sua sponte or at the suggestion of the prosecution.
Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial proceeding is held in chambers or other-
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endorsed the ABA guidelines, a number of state judicial systems
have.22 National adoption of these standards will reaffTrm our 200-
year-old commitment to open courts. Court closures will, once again,
be uncommon.23
Like Gannett, Herbert v. Lando24 was the object of passionate edi-
torial criticism. But unlike Gannett, the Herbert case was unremark-
able, and the reaction it provoked, unwarranted. After New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,25 Herbert was not only predictable, it was inevi-
table.
In Herbert the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a libel ac-
tion brought by a public figure must respond to deposition inquiries
regarding the defendant's state of mind in editing and publishing the
allegedly defamatory work. Had the Court reached the contrary result,
it would have been virtually impossible for public-figure libel plaintiffs
to satisfy Sullivan's demanding actual malice standard. Irresponsible
and unprofessional journalists would have enjoyed effective First
Amendment immunity from libel actions, and public figures who had
been unfairly maligned would have been left without remedies.
Still, the press reaction to this reasonable decision rivaled the re-
sponse to Gannett. Television commentators had their viewers
fantasizing about grand inquisitors searching the minds of film editors
for all sorts of Freudian purposes. The nature of the "mind reading"
wise closed to the public, a complete record shall be kept and made available to the public
following the completion of trial or earlier if consistent with trial fairness."
The standard's adoption of the clear and present danger test is consistent with recent
decisions concerning judicially imposed restraints on expression. See, e.g., Chicago Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 427 U.S. 912 (1976)
(court rules may not prohibit attorney comments unless particular statements pose a "serious
and imminent threat of interference with a fair trial"); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d
496, 507 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding, in part, that a press "gag" order did not meet the clear and
present danger test). The clear and present danger test has been abandoned in many other
areas. But, as Professor Emerson has observed, it is thriving in the judicial administration
context. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 456-57 (1970).
22. New Hampshire adopted these standards judicially before their ratification by the
ABA's House of Delegates. Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene District Court, 117 N.H. 959,
380 A.2d 261 (1977).
23. Court closures did not begin with Gannett. In the past, courts have been closed to
shield rape victims from public embarrassment (Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir.),
cer. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1966)), to protect the identities of undercover police agents (Lloyd
v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975)) and to prevent the
disclosure of confidential investigatory techniques (United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d
723 (2nd Cir. 1973)). But the number of closures in the last few months is unprecedented.
24. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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was left mostly to the imagination of the viewer.26
The interests of the press, and of all who value the First Amend-
ment, would have been better served by a more reasoned response.
Journalists tend to view to the First Amendment's guarantees as abso-
lute; any qualification of these guarantees, no matter how insignificant,
to accommodate other values is unacceptable. As a former reporter, I
appreciate these beliefs. But as a lawyer and a judge, I am convinced
that law, even constitutional law, must accommodate competing values.
Courts must enforce the rights of defamed plaintiffs just as much as
they must protect the press from undeserved, ruinous libel judgments.27
Some editorial recognition of this fact would greatly ease current ten-
sions between judges and journalists.
The pitch and tone of editorial response to Herbert bore little rela-
tion to the constitutional implications of that decision. By responding
so passionately, so inflexibly, to an apparently fair decision, the press
loses credibility. This creates the risk that when the -wolf," the case
that seriously threatens freedom of expression, appears, journalists'
cries might be disregarded by the public and by the courts. And we all
shall pay the price. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily28 may have been such a
case.
In Stanford Dai%', a case with which I had some experience,29 the
Supreme Court held that prosecutors may obtain search warrants for
information in office files, including those of newspapers or broadcast-
ers which are not implicated in any crime. Justice Stewart's dissent
persuasively argued that criminal justice and First Amendment inter-
ests would be better accommodated if, in most cases, prosecutors were
compelled to seek information through subpoenas, which the press
could challenge, rather than through warrants, which are usually issued
26. Despite the generally emotional tenor of editorial response to Herbert, some com-
mentary was well-reasoned. See, e.g., Reston, Courts and the Press, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1979, § A, at 31, col. 1; No License to Lie, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 20, 1979, § 5, at 2.
27. "Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."
W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act III, sc. 3.
28. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
29. Judges Hufstedler, Goodwin and East comprised the Ninth Circuit panel that af-
firmed the district court's judgment for the Stanford Daily, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), a f'g, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), a judgment which the
Supreme Court reversed. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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after a nonadversarial proceeding.3"
The press is justifiably concerned by this holding. Even if war-
rants are carefully drawn, police officers may unintentionally discover
materials compromising confidential press sources during newsroom
searches. Because journalists are not able to promise secrecy, sources
may be less willing to speak freely.3' The ability of the press to per-
form an essential constitutional function, investigating and exposing
corruption, may be seriously compromised.
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of StanfordDaily is the nature
of its potential "victims." Of the fifteen search warrants issued for
newsroom searches between 1971 and 1978, six involved "alternative"
or "third world" papers or radio stations. None involved a big-city
daily.3 2 Few district attorneys are willing to incur the wrath of influen-
tial broadcasters or publishers. But small, unconventional and unpop-
ular papers or stations cannot mobilize public opinion or afford lengthy
court battles. They are more vulnerable, more likely to be silenced by
fear of insolvency. The Founding Fathers appreciated the value of a
vital minority press as an ideal, if not always as a reality.33 The mar-
ketplace of ideas they envisioned will be less open because of this re-
sult.
It is ironic that the press, which historically has sought judicial-
constitutional protection from legislative measures, is now turning to
Congress and the state legislatures for statutes limiting the effect of
StanfordDaiy. The Senate Judiciary Committee is currently consider-
ing the "Bayh Amendment," which would bar police searches of news-
rooms absent an affirmative showing that resort to subpoenas would
endanger the orderly administration of justice. 34 Legislatures in Cali-
fornia, Connecticut and Nebraska have enacted similar measures.35
30. 436 U.S. at 570-77.
31. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-36 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Com-
pare Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege. An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229 (1971) with
Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argumentfor Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64
Nw. L. REv. 18 (1969).
32. Journalists Fear Impact of Court Rulings, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1979, § 1, at 1.
33. The ambiguity of the Framers' attitudes towards a free press was perhaps best ex-
pressed in statements by Thomas Jefferson, quoted by Justice Black in Bridges v. California:
"I deplore.., the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity,
the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write them .... These ordures are rap-
idly depraving the public taste.
"It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom
of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." 314 U.S. 252, 270 n.16 (1941).
34. S. 855, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980); 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 79-14; NEB.
REv. STAT. § 29-813 (Supp. 1979). See 48 U.S.L.W. 2046-47 (July 17, 1979).
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This resort to nonjudicial processes following Stanford Daily is
most desirable. For too long, journalists have worn constitutional
blinders, seeking their objectives almost exclusively in the courts while
ignoring feasible legislative or executive alternatives."a This reliance,
this closeness, has been unhealthy, for any judicial qualification of
press freedom has been regarded as a betrayal. Recognition that the
press can pursue its goals in several forums, that it can gain in the legis-
lature what it cannot win in the courts, will ease the current tension
between judges and journalists.
Bar-press relations can be further improved if journalists remem-
ber that, despite Gannett and Stanford Daiy, the news is not all bad.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently rejected claims of special
press rights, including rights of access37 and protection of confidential
sources,38 it has just as consistently recognized the right of the press to
publish what it possesses. In the Seventies the Court overturned prior
restraints39 and gag orders,40 reversed convictions for publishing the
names of alleged juvenile offenders41 and of judges who are subject to
disciplinary proceedings4" and denied recovery of civil damages for
broadcasting the identity of a rape victim. 43 The Court's message has
been clear: the press, as distinct from the public, enjoys no special
rights; but the right to publish is virtually absolute. This position,
which has been forcefully advanced by my colleague Hans Linde,' is
reasonable and principled.
36. One notable exception to this tradition of reliance on judicial remedies has been the
promotion of reporters' shield laws by media interest groups. The first of these statutes was
enacted in Maryland in 1897. Current version at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. (1974) CODE ANN.
§ 9-112. By January 1, 1979, 25 other states had passed similar legislation. See note 29
supra.
37. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
38. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
39. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
40. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
41. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
42. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
43. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
44. Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two Rights Against the State, 13 WILLAM-
ETTE L.J. 211, 218 (1977). Alexander Bickel also espoused this adversarial, "gamesmanship"
concept of the relationship between press and government. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 80 (1975).
Some commentators have observed that recognizing special press rights would lead to
the imposition of special duties on the press vis-A-vis the public's "right to know." See
Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. Rlv. 731 (1977); Lange, The Speech and
Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1976); Linde, supra. Another difficulty with accord-
ing the press special rights is the problem of defining who or what is "the press." See State
[Vol. 7:633
The tension between judges and journalists may be relaxed by
more careful reporting, interpretation and application of decisions; by
recognition that First Amendment values are not absolute and that ju-
dicial process is just one of many means through which the press may
achieve its ends; and by realizing that recent court holdings have not
compromised, but reaffirmed, the core of the First Amendment, the
right to publish. Bar-press seminars and educational programs like the
Ford Foundation fellowships for journalists at Yale Law School can
only increase understanding. But the most promising ways to improve
bar-press relations are to lower our voices and to remember who we are
and what, historically, we have meant to each other.
Judges tend to be wary of reporters. Most lawyers, by training and
client preference, become accustomed to working discreetly. It is not
surprising that many judges, as former lawyers, find it difficult to accept
that their work is now public business, subject to media scrutiny and
criticism.
But our work is public business. And we serve more responsibly
because the press reviews our actions. Ideally-in a civics textbook
world-judges decide cases in a vacuum, immune from external con-
siderations. In reality, however, anyone, including a judge, will act
more carefully if his or her decisions will be questioned in print. To
paraphrase H.L. Mencken, the press is our "conscience, an inner voice
that warns us that somebody is looking."'45 Although this accountabil-
ity does not, and probably should not, affect the outcome of many
cases, it results in better reasoned, more principled explanations of ju-
dicial decisions.
In a related sense, the press, by publicizing judicial decisions, gives
those decisions added credibility and legitimacy. Alexander Hamilton
recognized that the courts have no power but persuasion, no force but
v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244,436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (denial of reporter's
privilege claim based, in part, on equal protection implications of defining protected class).
It is notable that, in his oral argument in RichmondNewspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Profes-
sor Tribe did not assert a special press right of access to trials but a general public right to
attend such proceedings. 48 U.S.L.W. 3549-50 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1980).
45. Justice Frankfurter, if from a different perspective, expressed the same thought:
"Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criti-
cism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office are identi-
fied with the interests of justice they may forget their common human frailties and
fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there have also been
pompous wielders of authority who have used the paraphernalia of power in support of
what they called their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their limitations
and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with
candor however blunt." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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moral authority.46 The ultimate test of a court's persuasiveness is the
degree to which the public accepts and follows its decisions. And the
press is the instrument through which the courts communicate their
reasoning to the public. Our authority, our persuasiveness, is linked to
the vitality of the press.
Courts have benefited from the free press as conscience, as critic,
as correspondent. Conversely, journalists have profited greatly from
judges' steadfast, sometimes courageous, defense of the right to publish.
At least until now, the great battles for press freedom have been waged
and won in the courtroom.
Tension between judges and journalists is inevitable. But it need
not be neurotic. We have gained much and learned much from each
other. If we pause and remember our history, we will recognize that
each needs the other strong and vital. From this recognition tolerance
must grow.
46. "The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the commu-
nity. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment .. " THn FEDERALIST No. 78, (A.
Hamilton) at 504 (1976 ed.).
[Vol. 7:633
